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ABSTRACT
Bitcoin is a private currency issued and governed by a global
network of computers. Thus far, the majority of legal cases involving
bitcoin have been criminal prosecutions or disputes between bitcoin
companies. If bitcoin or some iteration continues to grow, courts will
need to craft rules of civil jurisdiction. This paper is the first attempt
to apply existing rules of civil procedure to bitcoin.
Bitcoins ought be treated as tangible property for the purposes of
jurisdiction. Although they have an incorporeal form, as a practical
matter, courts are able to site bitcoins to a single location and thus
should do so. This allows courts to apply existing due process and
comity jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a peculiar feature of our legal system that judges are often
asked to rule on subjects they have little or no direct knowledge of – that
a judge who balances his checkbook by hand will be asked to rule on
bitcoin. Yet these may be the judges best positioned to apply enduring
legal principles to cases that are “new in the instance,” like jurisdictional
disputes involving bitcoin.1 It is a judicial virtue to be able to rule
correctly on a complex phenomenon without having to learn its detailed
workings.2 Although some basic understanding is necessary, a judge
does not need to know the intricacies of bitcoin to understand how to
apply the rules of civil procedure to this new innovation.3
1. Pasley v. Freeman, 100 E.R. 450, 456 (1789) (Ashhurst, J.) (“. . .where the case
is only new in the instance, and the only question is upon the application of a principle
recognized in the law to such new case, it will be just as competent to Courts of Justice
to apply the principle to any case which may arise two centuries hence as it was two
centuries ago; if it were not, we ought to blot out of our law books one fourth part of the
cases that are to be found in them.”).
2. Compare Lubavitch-Chabad of Il., Inc. v. Nw. Univ., No. 14-1055, 2014 WL
5762937 (7th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014) (Judge Posner explicating “the background and the
various nuances” of Hasidic Judaism), with Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I join the
judgment of the Court, and all of its opinion except Part I–A and some portions of the
rest of the opinion going into fine details of molecular biology. I am unable to affirm
those details on my own knowledge or even my own belief”), and Transcript of Oral
Argument at 37-8, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (Justice Alito stating,
“Judge Posner . . . he’s the smartest man in the world. He knows everything there is to
know about law and economics and jurisprudence and literature and many other
subjects.”).
3. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207 (1996) (arguing that the best way to learn and craft the law of a particular
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Bitcoin is a technology that was first proposed in 2008 in a
whitepaper written by Satoshi Nakamoto.4 The term “bitcoin” refers
both to a private currency and the network of computers that runs the
currency.5 Much like dollars or euros, there are a certain number of
bitcoins in existence6 and consumers may buy, sell, and trade bitcoins
for various goods and services.7 Bitcoins are like dollars and euros in
that some bitcoins exist in physical forms such as tangible coins and
some bitcoins exist as numeric conventions, much like a bank’s account
at a Federal Reserve Bank.8
Unlike dollars and euros, however, governments do not issue
bitcoins, but instead a decentralized network of computers does so.9 To
belong to this network, a computer must abide by a certain set of
governing rules, known as protocols.10 One of the central protocols is
that no more than 21 million bitcoins will ever be created and this
creation will occur on a predetermined schedule.11
Consumers and investors have put hundreds of millions of dollars
into bitcoin and bitcoin companies.12 Bitcoin’s success vel non

field is to study general rules); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX
WORLD (Harvard Univ. Press 1995) (arguing that basic legal principles can and should
govern a complex, industrial society).
4. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN
PROJECT, http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
5. SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 4652121, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept.
18, 2014) (stating “[b]itcoin is a decentralized digital currency . . . “); Reuben Grinberg,
Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159,
207 n.71 (2012) (referring to the Bitcoin Protocol and its genesis).
6. As of publication there are 13.8 million bitcoins in existence. Total Bitcoins,
BLOCKCHAIN (Oct.-Nov. 2014), https://blockchain.info/charts/total-bitcoins.
7. United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 546-47 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014)
(demonstrating that bitcoins can be used to purchase illegal narcotics).
8. R. Joseph Cook, Bitcoins: Technological Innovation or Emerging Threat?, 30
J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 535, 549 (2014) (stating “ . . . bitcoins are being produced
in physical manifestations . . .”).
9. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2-4.
10. Id.
11. Grinberg, supra note 5, at 163.
12. Sydney Ember, Blockchain is Latest Bitcoin Start Up to Lure Big Investment,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/blockchain-islatest-bitcoin-start-up-to-lure-big-investment/?_r=0.
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notwithstanding, the ideas and concepts that it represents are now a part
of the world and are being addressed from a legal perspective.13
In contrast to the great amount of interest bitcoin has generated
from investors, computer programmers, and regulators, there are
relatively few judicial opinions on the subject.14 And while law review
articles abound,15 nothing has been written exclusively on bitcoin and
civil procedure. This Note seeks to remedy that paucity. Before a
jurisprudence can develop surrounding bitcoin, there must both be
courts that have jurisdiction over bitcoin and cases and controversies
presented to those courts.16 This Note addresses the subject of civil
jurisdiction and bitcoin.
There is a wide range of possible civil actions involving bitcoin.
Suppose a plaintiff discovers that a defendant stores bitcoins in the
jurisdiction where the plaintiff brings the action; can he attach those
bitcoins to the proceedings?17 What does it mean to say that the bitcoins
are “in” a jurisdiction?18
This Note’s basic approach is that novel problems do not require
novel solutions.19 Instead of crafting a new scheme with a complex set
of rules to govern this new technology, this Note contends that bitcoin
should receive the same treatment as all other forms of property for the
13. See, e.g., Grinberg, supra note 5; Isaac Pflaum & Emmeline Hateley, A Bit of A
Problem: National and Extraterritorial Regulation of Virtual Currency in the Age of
Financial Disintermediation, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1169 (2014); Derek A. Dion, I’ll
Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for A Byte Today: Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in
the E-Conomy of Hacker-Cash, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y, Spring 2013, at 165; Vesna
Harasic, It’s Not Just About the Money: A Comparative Analysis of the Regulatory
Status of Bitcoin Under Various Domestic Securities Laws, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 487
(2014); Matthew Kien-Meng Ly, Coining Bitcoin’s “Legal-Bits”: Examining the
Regulatory Framework for Bitcoin and Virtual Currencies, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 587,
605 (2014).
14. See infra note 74.
15. See, e.g., Grinberg, supra note 5; Pflaum & Hateley, supra note 13; Dion,
supra note 13, at 165; Harasic, supra note 13; Kien-Meng Ly, supra note 13, at 605.
16. Cf. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (the court not ruling on substantive trademark dilution claim involving a
website until it found it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant).
17. Cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 189 (1977) (defendant owning stock that
was sited by statute in Delaware).
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 3, contra Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:
What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999) (arguing that the nature of
cyberspace is unique and can reveal general principles of law).
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purposes of civil jurisdiction.20 Thus, the basic thesis of this Note is that
bitcoins are property that should be sited as tangibles with the same
constraints placed on a court’s in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction.21 As a
practical matter, this means that in whichever court a plaintiff is capable
of attaching bitcoins through seizure is the court that should be
presumed to have jurisdiction.22
This Note will begin with a technical explanation of bitcoin. The
purpose of this explanation is not to give the reader a comprehensive
understanding of bitcoin’s underlying plumbing, but rather tease out the
salient facts for legal purposes. Judges need not prove the Einsteinian
contention that all energy is mass to be able to pass judgment on
whether a trespass of a certain particle has occurred.23
The next section of the Note will discuss the current bitcoin
jurisprudence. The most cited cases thus far have been criminal
prosecutions.24 This makes sense, as a robust set of transactions
involving bitcoin is not likely until there is more legal certainty—
criminal prosecutions limn the scope of that certainty. 25 As of yet, there
have been no significant civil actions involving bitcoin as such.26 Most
of what has been adjudicated thus far have been simple contract disputes
between companies in the cryptocurrency industry; any mention of
bitcoin is incidental.27

20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Parts II.C.1-2.
Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 93-94 (Or. 1959) (“In fact, the now
famous equation E=mc2 has taught us that mass and energy are equivalents and that our
concept of ‘things’ must be reframed. If these observations on science in relation to the
law of trespass [sic] should appear theoretical and unreal in the abstract, they become
very practical and real to the possessor of land when the unseen force cracks the
foundation of his house. The force is just as real if it is chemical in nature and must be
awakened by the intervention of another agency before it does harm.”).
24. United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014); United
States v. Faiella, 39 F.Supp.3d 544 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2014).
25. Max Raskin, U.S. Agencies to Say Bitcoins Offer Legitimate Benefits,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201311-18/u-s-agencies-to-say-bitcoins-offer-legitimate-benefits (noting that bitcoin’s
prospects for wider accepted were boosted after the Department of Justice and other
agencies said that bitcoins were not illegal and offered benefits).
26. See infra note 74.
27. See, e.g., Meissner v. BF Labs Inc., No. 13-2617-RDR, 2014 WL 2558203,
at *1 (D. Kan. June 6, 2014) (breach of contract claim over bitcoin mining equipment).
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Following the analysis of the existing jurisprudence will begin the
discussion of civil procedure. This first section will explain why bitcoins
should be treated as tangibles and where they should be sited.
The next section will sketch the limits of a court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over bitcoins. It will include both the Supreme Court’s
constitutional concerns over jurisdiction, as well as policy concerns
involving comity between both domestic courts in the United States and
between domestic and foreign courts. The basic conclusion is that courts
should apply the same due process analysis to bitcoin that is applied to
other in rem and quasi in rem actions; this is the due process analysis
that finds its fountainhead in International Shoe Co v. State of
Washington.28
I. BACKGROUND
A. BITCOIN OVERVIEW
Whatever they are, bitcoins are something; while precise
definitions may be needed for certain purposes, for the purposes of this
Note, bitcoin is money.29 The defining feature of this money is that it is
the most successful currency to be issued by private actors.30
The genesis of bitcoin is a whitepaper published under the name
Satoshi Nakamoto.31 This paper proposed a network that would enable
individuals to exchange value without the need of a third party. As
articulated by Nakamoto, when one customer of a bank transfers money
to another customer of the same bank, the transaction relies on a third
party, i.e. the bank, for verification.32 What prevents an individual

28.
29.

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Compare Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 545 (Bitcoin clearly qualifies as “money”
or “funds” under these plain meaning definitions), and SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (“It is clear that Bitcoin can be
used as money.”), with I.R.S. Notice 2014-21Notice 2014-21: IRS Virtual Currency
Guidelines, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/201416_IRB/ar12.html (treating bitcoin as property for tax purposes).
30. Kevin Dowd, New Private Monies, INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, 38
(2014),
available
at
http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/
New%20Private%20Monies%20-%20Kevin%20Dowd.pdf.
31. Nakamoto, supra note 4. As of publication, the identity of Nakamoto is
unknown.
32. Dowd, supra note 30, at 40.
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customer from promising more than he has to multiple counterparties33
is that third party bank, which has verified the balance of his account on
their own ledger.34
Bitcoin does not rely on a third party, such as a bank, to verify
transactions.35 Instead the ledger, known as the blockchain, is distributed
throughout a network of computers so that the verification of
transactions is decentralized.36
One of the central components to the operation of bitcoin is the use
of public addresses and private keys.37 Just as a person’s bank account
number is identified as a series of numbers, a person’s bitcoin account
number is identified as a series of numbers and letters.38 This
alphanumeric string is known as the public address. It is called public
because anyone with access to the blockchain (the distributed ledger)
can view the balance of the address, as well as any transactions that go
in and out of the address.39 What allows an individual to own a certain
public address is his ownership of a private key40 associated with that
address.41 If an individual has the private key then he can spend the
bitcoins in the associated address.42 This public-key cryptography
scheme is much like a safety deposit box made of glass for anyone in the
world to see, but only those with the private key can open the glass box
to spend those bitcoins.43 Each of the transactions to and from public

33.
34.
35.

A problem known as double-spending.
Dowd, supra note 30, at 41.
Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 1 (“What is needed is an electronic payment system
based on cryptographic proof instead of trust . . . .”).
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id. at 2.
38. The following is my public address: 1CM42X649uesFqqH8rbMC1s7nTP
jmrMb1g.
39. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 6.
40. Essentially a string of numbers and letters.
41. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 6.
42. This occurs through a process of sending a message that is broadcast to the
bitcoin network. If Polonius wanted to send 100 bitcoins to Laertes, he would send a
message to the bitcoin network that states “Polonius sends 100 bitcoins to Laertes.” In
order to ensure that this is an authentic request, the network requires that this message
be signed with the private key. See generally Dion, supra note 13, at 165, 168
(explaining the mechanics of a bitcoin transaction).
43. For a more in-depth understanding of public-key cryptography, see R.C.
Merkle, Symposium Protocols for Public Key Cryptosystems, 122 INST. OF ELEC. AND
ELEC. ENG’RS, 125-26 (Apr. 1980); for a more circumspect understanding of public-key
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addresses is contained on the distributed ledger, which establishes how
many bitcoins each public address has.44 Users send bitcoins to other
users in exchange for goods and services.45
This recordation of transactions between users, however, does not
account for the origin of initial bitcoins.46 Much like gold, bitcoins are
brought into existence through a process known as “mining.”47 Mining
is essentially the process by which a computer can lend its computing
power to the bitcoin network in exchange for a predetermined set of
bitcoins.48 The network rewards computers that support the network
through newly minted bitcoins.49
Unlike state-run central banks, the bitcoin money-creation schedule
is predetermined and does not vary based on the vicissitudes of central
bank policy.50 Specifically, bitcoin is a deflationary currency and the
number of bitcoins will never exceed 21 million.51 The number of
bitcoins created every ten minutes is set to be reduced by half
approximately every four years such that the number of bitcoins will
asymptotically approach 21 million in the year 2140.52 These 21 million
bitcoins are currently capable of being divided out to eight decimal
places,53 allowing users to send fractions of bitcoins.54
For the purposes of this Note, the public address-private key aspect
of bitcoin is the most important because that is what will determine the

cryptography, see also PETER KENT, THE COMPLETE IDIOT’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET
120 (7th ed. 2000).
44. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2; see generally Jerry Brito & Andrea Castillo,
Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. 4
(2013) (explaining the mechanics of bitcoin for policymakers).
45. Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Virtual Currency Mining Operations,
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2014-R001 (Jan.
30, 2014) (clarifying the disclosure obligations of bitcoin “users”).
46. For a discussion of the genesis of money, see generally LUDWIG VON MISES,
THE THEORY OF MONEY AND CREDIT (Yale Univ. Press, 4th ed. 1953) (using a
regression theory to explain the present value of money).
47. See generally Brito & Castillo, supra note 44, at 3-7.
48. See id. at 5-6.
49. See Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 4.
50. Grinberg, supra note 5, at 168.
51. Id. at 178.
52. Brito & Castillo, supra note 44, at 7.
53. 0.00000001 bitcoins = 1 satoshi.
54. Brito & Castillo, supra note 44, at 7.
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locus of ownership.55 To restate the analogy, a public address is like a
transparent glass safety deposit box where anyone can see the amount of
bitcoins in that box.56 To extend the analogy, the private key is what
allows an individual to open the safety deposit box and transfer the
bitcoins held within.57 This is the transaction that gets recorded on the
blockchain; the accounting notation that debits bitcoins from one public
address and credits them to another is the transfer of bitcoins. 58 Private
keys can exist in many forms and it is these many forms that give rise to
the jurisdictional problems discussed below.59
Private keys can be printed on pieces of paper, they can be
memorized and exist solely in an individual’s head, they can be stored
on servers and hard-drives, and they can even be subdivided into
constitutive keys.60 Whatever their form, once an individual has access
to this private key and connects it to the bitcoin network, he is
authorized by the network spend the bitcoins in the associated public
address.61 Preventing others from accessing one’s private key establishes
exclusive ownership of bitcoins.62 This protection can be as simple as
printing the private key on a piece of paper, known as a “paper wallet”,
and storing it in a physical safety deposit box in a bank.63 The reason to
keep the private key private is because when someone has access to it,
they have access to the bitcoins “within” the public address and thus are
able to spend them.64
The reason “within” is so punctuated is because there is, strictly
speaking, no such thing as a bitcoin and therefore there can be no
bitcoins “in” an address.65 Instead, bitcoins are an accounting
convention.66 Bitcoins are a notation on a distributed ledger that says a
55. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2 (defining an “owner” as someone who is capable
of using a private key to digitally sign a transaction).
56. See supra note 43.
57. Id.
58. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2.
59. See generally Meissner v. BF Labs Inc., No. 13-2617-RDR, 2014 WL 2558203
(D. Kan. June 6, 2014).
60. See generally Vitalik Buterin, Multisig: The Future of Bitcoin, BITCOIN MAG.
(Mar. 12, 2014) (explaining multisignature technology).
61. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2.
62. Id.
63. See generally Buterin, supra note 60.
64. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2.
65. Id. (defining a coin as “a chain of digital signatures”).
66. Id.
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certain public address has a certain number associated with it that it is
allowed to transfer to other public addresses.67 This may make them
seem like they do not exist in a discrete location, but they do; they exist
wherever the private key exists.68 The accounting convention essentially
says that anyone who has access to X private key associated with X
public key can spend the bitcoins that are credited to that address in the
accounting ledger.69 In other words, any entity that knows the private
key controls the bitcoins.70
B. EXISTING BITCOIN JURISPRUDENCE
All bitcoin case law is divided into two parts: criminal and civil. 71
The following section of the paper will give an account of the existing
bitcoin jurisprudence, wary of the fact that this section could have a
short shelf life. As will be shown, the most novel questions of law have
been presented in the criminal sphere, as bitcoin is not established
enough to warrant large-scale commercial litigation.72 While the
criminal cases present complex questions, the civil cases, as least thus
far, have been confined to simple commercial and contract disputes that
are not about bitcoin per se, but rather involve parties who are somehow
connected to the bitcoin universe.73

67.
68.

Id.
In the same way a house exists wherever a person can enter and use that house.
This is not to say that there are not other features of bitcoins or houses, but merely that
the ability to engage with these things is a sufficient condition to locating them. See
infra note 265 and accompanying text.
69. Although this makes bitcoin different from a single party accounting
convention that does not have any tangible manifestation such as a company’s
recordation of its shareholders. One may be tempted to say that the recordation is the
site of the shareholders shares, but this is not the case for the shareholder’s shares are a
legal relationship that exists irrespective of the recordation. This is to say that if a
company unilaterally changes its book, that does not change who owns how many
shares.
70. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2.
71. Compare Meissner v. BF Labs Inc., No. 13-2617-RDR, 2014 WL 2558203 (D.
Kan. June 6, 2014), with United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F.Supp.3d 540, 569 (S.D.N.Y.
July 9, 2014) (noting that the former is a civil case, while the latter is a criminal case).
72. See infra note 74 (demonstrating that all previous cases have been commercial
disputes and not bitcoin disputes as such).
73. See infra note 74 (demonstrating that all previous cases have been commercial
disputes and not bitcoin disputes as such).
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1. Civil
The majority of civil cases involving bitcoin have been commercial
disputes between small parties.74 Of those civil cases, a large number
relate to the sale of bitcoin mining equipment and a failure to deliver in
a timely manner, rendering the equipment substantially less valuable.75
The more computers that are mining for bitcoin, the more difficult the
mining becomes and thus each day of delay decreases the amount of
bitcoins a contracted piece of mining equipment can produce.76
The notable exception to these contract disputes is an enforcement
action by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) against
Trendon Shavers, who ran a Ponzi scheme denominated in bitcoins. 77
The SEC ordered Shavers to disgorge $40.4 million and pay $150,000 in
civil penalties for violating the Securities Exchange Acts.78

74. See, e.g., Meissner, 2014 WL 2558203, at *1 (breach of contract claim over
bitcoin mining equipment); Morici v. Hashfast Technologies LLC, No. 5:14-CV00087-EJD, 2015 WL 906005, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2015) (breach of contract and
fraud claim over bitcoin mining equipment); Hussein v. Coinabul, LLC, No. 14 C 5735,
2014 WL 7261240, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2014) (class action alleging fraud, breach
of contract, and unjust enrichment for failure to deliver bullion in exchange for bitcoin);
F.T.C. v. BF Labs Inc., No. 4:14-CV-00815-BCW, 2014 WL 7238080, at *1 (W.D.
Mo. Dec. 12, 2014) (alleged violation of Federal Trade Commission Act over material
misrepresentation of bitcoin mining machines); Lenell v. Advanced Min. Tech., Inc.,
No. 14-CV-01924, 2014 WL 7008609, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2014) (class action
involving failure to deliver and material misrepresentation of bitcoin mining
equipment); TradeHill, Inc. v. Dwolla, Inc., No. C-12-1082 MMC, 2012 WL 1622668,
(N.D. Cal. May 9, 2012) (contract dispute between bitcoin exchange and financial
service provider); Alexander v. BF Labs Inc., No. 14-2159-KHV, 2014 WL 5406890
(D. Kan. Oct. 22, 2014) (class action claim of unjust enrichment over the sale of bitcoin
mining equipment).
75. See, e.g., Meissner, 2014 WL 2558203, at *1 (“ . . . plaintiff claims that if he
had received the Bitcoin Miners earlier, he would have “mined” approximately 5,000 to
7,500 Bitcoins.”).
76. Cf. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854) (resulting damages from failure to
deliver a crankshaft on time were limited by reasonable foreseeability).
77. SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6,
2013).
78. SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 4652121, at *13 (E.D. Tex. Sept.
18, 2014).
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As an initial matter, Shavers argued that because bitcoin was not
money, he was not in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 77b.79 The court rejected
this argument:
It is clear that Bitcoin can be used as money. It can be used to
purchase goods or services, and as Shavers stated, used to pay for
individual living expenses. The only limitation of Bitcoin is that it is
limited to those places that accept it as currency. However, it can
also be exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the U.S.
dollar, Euro, Yen, and Yuan. Therefore, Bitcoin is a currency or
form of money, and investors wishing to invest in BTCST provided
80
an investment of money.

An important takeaway from this ruling is that courts are not going
to allow technical definitions supplant their commonsense
understandings.81
2. Criminal
While civil litigation is sparse, there have been two significant
criminal prosecutions that directly address new legal problems posed by
bitcoin.82 The following section will not be an exhaustive account of
those criminal prosecutions, but rather briefly explain them with an eye
towards gleaning lessons for the civil sphere.
The two most important criminal cases relating to bitcoin are were
prosecuted in federal court in the Southern District of New York.83 Both
cases are related to the website Silk Road, an online marketplace for
illegal goods and services that the Federal Bureau of Investigations shut

79.
80.
81.

Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, at *1.
Id. at *2.
There is a debate among economists about whether bitcoin is money based on
its fulfillment of certain criteria. See David Yermack, Is Bitcoin a Real Currency? An
Economic Appraisal, NBER Working Paper No. 19747 (Dec. 2013). This discussion is
separate from judges’ decisions on disputes involving bitcoin. As the Shavers decision
shows, when courts see an object that walks, talks, and acts like money, they will
conclude that it is, in fact, money, even if it does not fulfill certain criteria in economic
theory. It is worth noting that the blockchain has uses beyond money and has been
proposed as a medium for recording deeds and establishing title.
82. United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); United
States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
83. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540; Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544.

2015]

REALM OF THE COIN: BITCOIN AND
CIVIL PROCEDURE

981

down in October of 2013.84 The first of these cases is the prosecution of
Ross William Ulbricht, who the government alleged, “designed, created,
operated, and owned Silk Road, the most sophisticated and extensive
criminal marketplace on the Internet.”85 Ulbricht was convicted on all
seven counts charged.86 The second case was the prosecution of Charles
Shrem87 and Robert Faiella who were indicted on multiple counts,
including operating an unlicensed money transmission business and
conspiracy to commit money laundering.88
Both judges have issued opinions that relate directly to how bitcoin
ought be classified, which will have implications for civil cases. 89
Faiella and Shrem claimed that they were not engaged in unlicensed
money transmission because, inter alia, bitcoin is not money.90 Judge
Jed Rakoff ruled against this contention, citing to the Shavers decision
mentioned above, “Bitcoin clearly qualifies as ‘money’ or ‘funds’ under
these plain meaning definitions. Bitcoin can be easily purchased in
exchange for ordinary currency, acts as a denominator of value, and is
used to conduct financial transactions.”91
Ulbricht, too, argued that bitcoin is not a monetary instrument,
citing to the Internal Revenue Service’s rule that treated bitcoins as
property for tax purposes.92 Like Judge Rakoff, Judge Katherine Forrest
did not find these arguments compelling: “neither the IRS nor FinCEN
purport to amend the money laundering statute (nor could they).”93
Instead, she looked to the state statute and case law to conclude that

84. Emily Flitter, FBI Shuts Alleged Online Drug Marketplace, Silk Road,
REUTERS (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/02/us-crime-silkroadraid-idUSBRE9910TR20131002.
85. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 549.
86. Benjamin Weiser, Man Behind Silk Road Website Is Convicted on All Counts,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/nyregion/man-behindsilk-road-website-is-convicted-on-all-counts.html.
87. Max Raskin, Meet the Bitcoin Millionaires, BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2013),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-04-10/meet-the-bitcoin-millionaires
[hereinafter Meet the Bitcoin Millionaires].
88. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 545.
89. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 569; Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 545.
90. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 545.
91. Id.
92. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 569 (quoting I.R.S. Notice 2014–21).
93. Id.
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bitcoin could be used as a monetary instrument for the purpose of
laundering.94
While Judge Forrest’s opinion correctly classifies bitcoin as money,
she makes an error in saying bitcoin “cannot be put on a shelf and
looked at or collected in a nice display case. Its form is digital—bits and
bytes that together constitute something of value.”95 As was shown
above and will be shown below, bitcoins can be, and often are, put on a
shelf and looked at.96 By creating a physical manifestation of the private
key, such as by printing it out on a piece of paper, one has instantiated
the bitcoins.97 Furthermore, while “bits and bytes” may be binary
collections of information, the very existence of computers is a
testament to the fact that these bits and bytes can be reified onto
physical hardware.98 Computer memory is a physical phenomenon. If
one destroys a hard drive with a private key on it, then the information
and bitcoins themselves are destroyed.99
While quibbling with Judge Forrest on this physical representation
point may seem pedantic, it has serious implications; the government’s
own case contradicts her assertion.100 In the seizure order against
Ulbricht, the district court listed as “defendants-in-rem” “any and all
assets of silk road, including but not limited to the silk road hidden
website and any and all bitcoins contained in wallet files residing on silk
road servers . . . “101
This language is telling; the bitcoins are “contained” and “residing”
much like one would say a Krugerrand is contained in a safety deposit
box residing at a certain bank.102 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) was able to seize the bitcoins from physical servers and then

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 570.
Dowd, supra note 30, at 49; see supra note 8.
Id.
Yates v. United States, No. 13-7451, 2015 WL 773330, at *12 (U.S. Feb. 25,
2015) (“A hard drive, however, is . . . .“).
99. Meet the Bitcoin Millionaires, supra note 87 (noting how bitcoins can be
permanently lost when private keys are destroyed or inaccessible).
100. In the order to seize the Silk Road bitcoins, the court labeled the bitcoin as
“defendants-in-rem.” Second Post-Complaint Protective Order, Ulbricht, No. 13 Civ.
6919 (JPO), ECF (2013).
101. Id. at *1.
102. Id.
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transfer them to their own wallet.103 Because this process must
necessarily have taken place on the blockchain, all the transactions are
transparent and it is possible to see the FBI’s own wallet.104 Thus, much
like the FBI’s ability to seize and auction off Krugerrands, the FBI
auctioned off bitcoins seized from the operation of Silk Road.105 Judge
Forrest mentioned the analogy to gold. 106 Bitcoin is not as incorporeal
as Judge Forrest claimed in dictum; criminal in rem attachments are
likely to continue to prove this claim if they follow.107
Courts have begun sketching out the contours of jurisdiction over
bitcoin and there are some important principles that can be gleaned from
a reading of these cases.108 The use of bitcoin does not allow one to skirt
existing laws because courts have fit bitcoin into existing
jurisprudence.109 Instead of waiting for legislation or regulation, courts
will apply their own understandings of bitcoin.110 Both the criminal and
civil cases thus far lead to the conclusion that bitcoin is tangible
property for the purposes of civil jurisdiction.111 This note will expound
this theory below.

103. Sydney Ember, U.S. Announces Third Bitcoin Auction, N.Y. TIMES (February
18,
2015),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/18/u-s-announces-third-bitcoinauction/.
104. 1FfmbHfnpaZjKFvyi1okTjJJusN455paPH is the FBI’s public address for the
Silk Road seizure. DPR Seized Coins, BLOCKCHAIN, accessible at
https://blockchain.info/address/1FfmbHfnpaZjKFvyi1okTjJJusN455paPH.
105. Ember, supra note 103.
106. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
107. Second Post-Complaint Protective Order, Ulbricht, No. 13 Civ. 6919 (JPO),
ECF (2013); cf. Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125
(d)(2)(A) (2012) (statutorily guaranteeing in rem jurisdiction against specific domain
names).
108. See supra note 93 (detailing those principles).
109. See supra note 91.
110. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
111. See infra Part II.B.1.
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II. BITCOIN AND CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. CIVIL PROCEDURE OVERVIEW
1. In Personam, In Rem, and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction
Before applying existing principles of civil procedure to bitcoin, it
is worth briefly sketching those principles. To begin, there are different
kinds of jurisdiction that courts can have over entities.112 The first is
called in personam or personal jurisdiction, which arises from the
original English writ of capias ad respondendum.113 This form of
jurisdiction exists when a court seeks to enact a judgment on a legal
person.114 The second form is called in rem jurisdiction.115 This form of
jurisdiction exists when a court seeks to enact a judgment on a res116, or
thing, found within the territorial borders of the state, where the thing is
related to the suit.117 These things can be varied and comical.118 Finally
there exists what is known as quasi in rem jurisdiction.119 This form of

112.
113.

See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“ . . . the capias ad
respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of
notice . . . .”).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 5 (1982) (“A state may exercise
jurisdiction over a person who has a relationship to the state such that the exercise of
jurisdiction is reasonable.”).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 (1982) (“In this type of
proceeding, the court undertakes to determine all claims that anyone has to the thing in
question.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.2 (1971) (“When a
thing is subject to the judicial jurisdiction of a state, an action may be brought to affect
the interests in the thing of all persons in the world. Such an action is commonly
referred to as a proceeding in rem.”).
116. Latin for “a particular thing [or] matter.” Res, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/res.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 (1982).
118. See, e.g., United States v. 422 Casks of Wine, 26 U.S. 547 (1828); United
States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934);
United States v. 11 1/4 Dozen Packages of Article Labeled in Part Mrs. Moffat’s Shoo
Fly Powders for Drunkenness, 40 F. Supp. 208 (W.D.N.Y. 1941); United States v.
$124,700 in U.S. Currency, 458 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark Fins, 520 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008).
119. There are two forms of quasi in rem jurisdiction, but for the purposes of this
Note we will merely refer to the second type. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
6 (1982) (“ . . . in this type of proceeding, a thing owned by a specified person is seized
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jurisdiction exists where a court seeks to enact judgment on a thing,
where the cause of action is unrelated to the thing. 120 An example of
quasi in rem jurisdiction would be attachment of securities to satisfy a
tort judgment in a foreign state.121
Originally, the above forms of jurisdiction were based on the
practical considerations of where a court could physically exercise
jurisdiction.122 In the case of Pennoyer v. Neff, the Supreme Court held
that an Oregon court’s exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Neff, a
non-resident who was not served process while in the state, was
unconstitutional.123 The physical presence of either the defendant or his
property in the territorial borders of the state was central to the Court’s
calculus.124 This theory of jurisdiction based on physical presence gave
way to a theory of jurisdiction based on principles laid out in
International Shoe v. Washington.125 There, a Washington court was
held to have personal jurisdiction over a non-resident corporate
defendant who had a staff of around a dozen employees in the state. 126
The Court expanded the test beyond territorial jurisdiction and held “due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’”127
Until the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shaffer v. Heitner, the new
jurisdictional test of International Shoe only applied to a court’s
exercise of in personam jurisdiction.128 Shaffer changed this by applying
the “minimum contacts” test to quasi in rem actions.129 In Shaffer, a
Delaware statute sited corporate shares of a Delaware corporation in the

as a basis for exercising jurisdiction to decide a claim against the owner. The claim
does not concern interests in the thing; it concerns some other transaction.” ).
120. Id.
121. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (plaintiff sought to sequester shares of
Greyhound stock owned by defendants).
122. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
123. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
124. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 313.
127. Id. at 316.
128. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
129. Id. at 207.
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state, giving its courts jurisdiction over those shares. 130 The Delaware
Court of Chancery sequestered shares of Greyhound stock belonging to
28 non-resident defendants as an exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction.131
The Supreme Court held that this was unconstitutional because the 28
non-resident defendants did not have sufficient contacts with the state. 132
After Shaffer, the “mere existence” of a res in its territory is not enough
to give the court jurisdiction over the res.133 Now, the exercise of any
type of jurisdiction must comport with the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.134
For basic in rem jurisdiction where the conflict arises over a res
within the territorial borders of a state, it is unusual that a court would
not be able to exercise jurisdiction.135 The existence of a thing in a state
creates a strong presumption in favor of a court’s exercise of jurisdiction
over that thing.136 As the Court held in Shaffer,
. . . when claims to the property itself are the source of the
underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it
would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to
have jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant’s claim to property
located in the State would normally indicate that he expected to
137
benefit from the State’s protection of his interest.

It is important to note that the Supreme Court has held that due
process concerns are primarily implicated before judgments are
rendered.138
130.
131.
132.
133.

DEL.CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 169 (2014).
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 194.
Id. at 216-17.
See RICHARD C. RUSKELL, DAVIS & SHULMAN’S GEORGIA PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 6:3 (2014-15 ed. 2014).
134. “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
135. See id.
136. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207-08.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 228 n.36 (“Once it has been determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no
unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant
has property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine the
existence of the debt as an original matter.”).
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How the minimum contacts test has changed since International
Shoe and the wisdom of that change is beyond the scope of this paper. It
is simply necessary to note that whenever a court seeks to exercise
power over a res it is bounded by the Fourteenth Amendment.139
2. Tangibles and Intangibles
Before classifying bitcoins for the purposes of civil jurisdiction, it
is useful to note the difference between tangible and intangible property.
Tangibles are physical objects, like houses or automobiles, and they
have physical a situs,140 while intangibles, like stock options or business
goodwill only have a situs as a legal fiction.141 In Yates v. United States,
a plurality of the Supreme Court held that an undersized red grouper was
not “tangible” for the purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.142 The Court
did not, however, deny that the plain meaning of the term tangible refers
to a discrete thing that possesses physical form.143
One helpful test for determining whether an object is tangible or
intangible is whether it has “intrinsic value.”144 Resorting to legal
fictions has come under criticism; some have advocated scrapping the
invocation of intangibles entirely and instead, propose looking to the
party in control of the intangible and his relation to the relevant court.145
Tangibles have never posed the same kind of problems because they
have a physical location, making them conceptually easy to site without
invoking legal fictions.146 This distinction between tangibles and
intangibles is important because, as will be shown below, a bitcoin is a
tangible, even though it has digital aspects.147

139.
140.

Id. at 216-17.
“Property that has physical form and characteristics.” Property, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1335-38 (9th ed. 2009).
141. “Property that lacks a physical existence.” Property, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1335-38 (10th ed. 2014); Aaron Simowitz, Siting Intangibles, 46 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 12 (forthcoming 2015).
142. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015).
143. Id.
144. R & L Zook, Inc. v. Pac. Indem. Co., No. CIV.A. 07-03774, 2008 WL
1931006, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 2008) (holding “a check is not ‘tangible property’
because it does not have intrinsic value”).
145. See Simowitz, supra note 141.
146. Lee, infra note 302, at 126.
147. See infra Part II.B.1.
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B. BITCOIN AND JURISDICTION
1. Bitcoin Qua Tangible Res
With the above in mind, we can begin to analyze how courts ought
treat bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies for the purposes of jurisdiction.
The first question that must be asked is what bitcoin is for the
purposes of jurisdiction. This Note contends bitcoin is a legal thing with
an actual situs and thus should be treated as tangible property without
having to invoke various legal fictions. The major benefit of this
approach is that it allows courts to escape the mire of intangibility
jurisprudence.148
At English common law, a res did not have to have a corporeal
form.149 What makes bitcoin a tangible is that it has intrinsic value
wherever it exists.150 Courts are capable of discharging debts and thus
148. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958) (“Founded on physical power . . .
the in rem jurisdiction of a state court is limited by the extent of its power and by the
coordinate authority of sister States. The basis of jurisdiction is the presence of the
subject property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum State. Tangible property
poses no problem for the application of this rule, but the situs of intangibles is often a
matter of controversy.”); Fletcher R. Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against
Nonresident Claimants, 49 YALE L.J. 241 (1939) (italics in original) (“Exercise by a
court of jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem 1 is valid only if the property or res involved
be within the territorial boundaries over which the court holds sway. If the subject
matter of the action is real property or tangible personal property, it is comparatively
simple to determine whether the res is within those boundaries. But when intangible
property is involved, the problem becomes far more complex.”).
149. “The word ‘things’ has a general signification, which comprehends corporeal
and incorporeal objects, of whatever nature, sort or specie.” 3 CO. INST. 482; 1 BOUV.
INST. n.415.
150. Nakamoto stipulates that bitcoin are transferred through the process of private
key signatures. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2. This means that someone who is able to
sign a transfer with a private key is possess the bitcoins because he can do as he choses
with them. This ownership is not necessarily a legal ownership, just as possessing a
wad of cash does not mean the individual is the legal owner. What this means is that,
like cash, there is something intrinsically valuable to the private key, even if there is no
extrinsic confirmation of legal title. The holder of the private key does not need to go to
a court to declare that his private key can transfer bitcoins anymore than someone who
finds cash needs to go to a court to declare that the cash will be accepted at a store. We
can contrast this with R & L Zook, Inc. v. Pac. Indem. Co., No. CIV.A. 07-03774, 2008
WL 1931006, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 2008) (holding “a check is not ‘tangible property’
because it does not have intrinsic value”). A check, on the other hand, only has value if
another individual or institution is willing to accept it. While it is true that a store can
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the nature of debt is that it is dependent on some legal regime of
enforcement.151 As a technical matter, bitcoin does not depend on any
legal regime to function; an individual who possesses a private key has
possession of the value of the number of bitcoins associated with that
key, irrespective of whether he is the rightful owner.152
What also makes bitcoin distinguishable from intangibles is that
bitcoins can be located in a place separate from its owner, whereas debts
represent legal relationships and “follow” a person wherever he goes.153
With bitcoin, however, if a thief steals the physical manifestation of a
bitcoin, he can steal the bitcoins and can deprive the previous owner of
control.154
In one sense, they are like bearer instruments, which can be stolen
because courts give independent legal significance to the document
itself.155 In order to transform a financial instrument representing debt or

refuse to accept cash if it believes it is stolen, that does not change the fact that the cash
is fungible and there are no practical barriers to acceptance. Similarly with bitcoin, a
private key associated with the bitcoin network will functionally be able to transfer
bitcoins without a third-party giving legal title of the key to the key’s possessor. By
intrinsic here, we merely mean having value without a third-party needing to verify
legal title.
151. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2012) (“ . . . the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of
all debts provided for by the plan . . . .”).
152. What the market values those bitcoins—potentially without legal title—is a
separate question. But a court cannot say that an object that the market assigns value to
does not have value. Blood diamonds may be legally tainted, but they are diamonds
nonetheless. Diamonds, gold, or bitcoins may be legally tainted and unassignable, but
they can still have value. Buying, Selling, & Redeeming, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Currency/Pages/edu_faq_
currency_sales.aspx (admitting that while “[t]he redemption [of gold certificates] . . .
will be at the face value on the note[, t]hese notes may, however, have a “premium”
value to coin and currency collectors or dealers[,]” showing the distinction between the
legal value assigned by the state and the intrinsic value to others is not changed by the
redemption value received from the Treasury).
153. GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 600 § 22.3
(1965).
154. Jack Smith IV, Bitcoin Crime Wave Breaks Out in NYC, NEW YORK OBSERVER
(February 20, 2015); Meet the Bitcoin Millionaires, supra note 87 (“Shrem wears a ring
engraved with a code that gives him access to the electronic wallet on his computer.
Friends tease him that a thief could cut off his finger to get the ring. ‘They started
calling me four-finger Charlie,’ he says.”).
155. W. H. Bates, Conflict of Laws: Negotiable Instruments: Situs of Bearer Bonds
under the Trading with the Enemy Act, MICH. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1952) (“Both courts
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equity into a bearer instrument, the legal relationship must be
instantiated.156
In another sense, they are not like bearer instruments and there is
no need to invoke the specter of intangibility. 157 While courts of equity
in England could grant relief that eased the link between the instrument
and obligation, no such relief can be granted with bitcoin for the simple
fact that a bitcoin does not represent a legal relationship, but a physical
one.158 A court can “say” that a person is allowed to spend bitcoins that
he has lost the private key to, but as a practical mater, once a private key
is lost, the bitcoins are lost.159 A court’s intangibility jurisprudence here
will sound like King Canute, declaring a bitcoin to exist where none
does.160
A court cannot invoke intangibility because bitcoins are
information that must be instantiated in some form into the corporeal
world to be used.161 In order to transfer bitcoins, the private key must
interact with the bitcoin network from some location. 162 This reification
happens on computers connected to the bitcoin network and a
computer’s hard drive is a thing with a situs, making a network a
composition of physical computers with physical locations.163
These physical locations are possible to pinpoint.164 In the simplest
case, a private key can be printed out on a piece of paper and then stored
[law and equity] preferred to think of the instrument as the obligation itself and not
merely evidence thereof.”).
156. See, e.g., UCC § 3-204.
157. Bates, supra note 155, at 1058. (“The difficulty of determining the situs of
intangibles has long plagued the courts.”).
158. Bates, supra note 155.
159. See infra note 166.
160. Unlike the instantiation of debt or equity, the instantiation of bitcoins from an
intangible to a tangible is a purely private act that needs no sanction by a legal regime.
Debt and equity only exist as relationships in some kind of legal framework; bitcoin,
much like gold, exists as technological and natural phenomenon prior to the state or
legal relationships—much like the tides. See also Robinson v. Wirts, 127 A.2d 706, 715
(1956) (“ . . . a declaration which opposes demonstrated phenomena can no more
influence the tide of modern scientific law than King Canute’s edict could shut out the
waves of the Atlantic Ocean.”).
161. The protocol requires that an owner use his private key to sign a transaction;
this cannot take place in the ether. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2.
162. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2.
163. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088-89 (2015).
164. Internet protocol addresses are a series of numbers that are assigned to a
particular device capable of connection to a network. DARPA Internet Program
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in a safety deposit box.165 So long as there are no other copies of that
private key, the situs of the private key is in the safety deposit box. 166
Anyone who has physical access to that safety deposit box has access to
those bitcoins because he has access to the private key capable of
signing transactions.167 A private key stored on “the cloud” is actually
stored on a physical server somewhere; there is no such thing as “the
cloud,” but rather a system of physical servers owned by data storage
companies in large centers throughout the country.168 Computer harddrives exist and the purpose of an Internet Protocol (IP) address is to
locate them when they are attached to a network.169
An instructive analogue to the siting of bitcoins is the judicial and
legislative siting of domain names. In response to claims of trademark
infringement made against “cyber-squatters” Congress passed the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter the ACPA). 170 The
relevant provision allows the owner of a mark to file “an in rem civil
action against a domain name in the judicial district in which the domain
name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority
that registered or assigned the domain name is located” provided the
owner was unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction through due
diligence and notice or did not know who the owner of the domain
was.171 As a practical matter, this “beset” the Eastern District of Virginia
with cybersquatting cases after the passage of the ACPA in 1999.172 The

Protocol Specification, INTERNET CONTROL MESSAGE PROTOCOL § 2.3 (Sept. 1981),
available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc791 (“A name indicates what we seek. An
address indicates where it is. A route indicates how to get there. The internet protocol
deals primarily with addresses.”).
165. Tyler Evans, The Ledger Wallet Nano: Cutting-Edge Hardware Security,
BITCOIN MAG. (February 16, 2015).
166. When a single copy of a private key is lost, the bitcoins themselves are forever
lost. Meet the Bitcoin Millionaires, supra note 87 (reporting on early bitcoin adopters
whose bitcoins were permanently lost when hard drives were reformatted or destroyed).
167. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2.
168. Paul T. Jaeger et al., Where Is the Cloud? Geography, Economics,
Environment, and Jurisdiction in Cloud Computing, FIRST MONDAY (Apr. 2009),
available at http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2456/2171 (last
accessed Mar. 5, 2015).
169. See supra note 164.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(2)(A).
172. Andrew J. Grotto, Due Process and in Rem Jurisdiction Under the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001).
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reason is that the Eastern District of Virginia is home to Network
Solutions.173 Network Solutions has both the practical ability and legal
responsibility to transfer a domain name if so ordered by the court.174
Since the passage of the ACPA, courts have grappled with the
definition of minimum contacts in the digital age.175 What they have not
grappled with, however, is the situs of the domain name, and the reasons
for this are not merely statutory. 176 Much like bitcoins, which are
capable of being spent wherever an individual has access to a private
key, a domain name is capable of being assigned to a different
individual wherever someone is capable of changing the domain name
registry to which other computers in the Internet network are
connected.177 A domain name registrar, much like bitcoins, does not

173.
174.

Id.
But see Stern v. Iran (D.D.C. 2014) (“[T]he country code Top Level Domain
names at issue may not be attached in satisfaction of plaintiff’s judgments because they
are not property subject to attachment under District of Columbia law.”); Network
Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 (Va. 2000) (“ . . . whatever
contractual rights the judgment debtor has in the domain names at issue in this appeal,
those rights do not exist separate and apart from NSI’s services that make the domain
names operational Internet addresses. Therefore, we conclude that ‘a domain name
registration is the product of a contract for services between the registrar and
registrant.’”). There is a fundamental distinction between these courts analyses and the
res analysis of bitcoin. A domain name company, like ICANN, is contractually bound
to point an Internet Service Provider to the server associated with the owned domain.
With bitcoin, there is no intermediary step required because simply connecting to the
network with the appropriate key establishes the existence of the property. There is no
need for a third-party to verify for other third-parties, thus there is no concept of bitcoin
as a “service” like these courts applied to domain names. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 1
(“What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead
of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the
need for a trusted third party.”) (emphasis added).
175. Compare Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (finding jurisdiction based on a sliding scale test applied to the nature
of a website’s contact with the forum state), with Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, 937
F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding the existence of an online advertisement in
a state enough to establish personal jurisdiction).
176. Grotto, supra note 172, at 14; 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(2)(A) (2012) (The ACPA
siting the res in the company’s jurisdiction, precisely because that’s where the company
is capable of exercising control).
177. Grotto, supra note 172, at 15 (demonstrating that plaintiffs have a remedy
against registrars, which are capable of redirecting traffic so as to comply with
trademark protections).
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exist in the ether, but is instantiated on servers throughout the country. 178
Thus there was technical logic behind the ACPA’s invocation of in rem
action, much like there is technical logic behind current legal
proceedings’ invocation of in rem action with respect to bitcoin.179
2. Complications to Bitcoin as Tangible Property
There are, however, some potential arguments and complications
with treating bitcoin as tangibles under in rem jurisdiction. The first
argument is that bitcoins are analogous to debts and contractual
relationships to pay and thus should be sited as intangibles are sited, not
as tangibles.180 A bank account is an example of an intangible whose
“actual situs” does not prevent courts from exercising personal
jurisdiction over the banking corporation to freeze assets. 181 This is
because banks are not simply storing customers’ segregated money in
the equivalent of individual safety deposit boxes; they use accounting
mechanisms to credit and debit customers in their ledger.182 Thus, it
makes sense for courts to exercise power over bank accounts by
exercising personal jurisdiction over the banking corporation because
there is only a ledger book to adjust.183 New York, for instance, is able
178.
179.
180.

Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 84 n.8 (Va. 2000).
Grotto, supra note 172, at 14.
There is however, a distinction between bank accounts and bank transfers. See,
e.g., United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1158 (2d Cir.1986)
(stating bank credit is “clearly ‘traceable proceeds’ under the forfeiture statute”); United
States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1993) (relying on Banco Cafetero
Panama to hold that electronic fund transfer are a seizable res); Arizona v. W. Union
Fin. Servs., Inc., 208 P.3d 218, 226 (Ariz. 2009) (holding that a bank wire is not located
within the state and therefore cannot be seized even though the corporation that
processed the wire is subject to jurisdiction).
181. United States v. First Nat. City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384 (1965) (“Once
personal jurisdiction of a party is obtained, the District Court has authority to order it to
‘freeze’ property under its control, whether the property be within or without the United
States.”).
182. Banks really only hold a portion of their clients money; through reserve
requirements, i.e. legal impunity to issue receipts in excess of chattels, and the legal
permission to comingle funds, they are able to expand credit. Reserve Requirements,
FED. RESERVE, available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
reservereq.htm.
183. Cf. Cameco Indus., Inc. v. Mayatrac, S.A., 789 F. Supp. 200, 203 (D. Md.
1992) (holding that in the absence of personal jurisdiction over a banking corporation, a
court can still exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a bank account).
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to exercise jurisdiction over bank accounts because so many banks are
domiciled in the state.184
The reason why bitcoins should not be treated like bank accounts is
that bitcoins do not require a counterparty to own and possess, whereas
bank accounts do.185 When a person deposits his cash in a bank, he has
ceded his actual, exclusive control over that money; a bank can freeze
his account and put limits on the amounts that he can withdraw.186 One
may argue that an online password or PIN number gives control over
money in an account, but this is not the case.187 A bank, for a number of
reasons, including to satisfy a judgment, can refuse to give money to a
person who holds a legitimate password; they can lock a customer out of
his account.188 This is not analogous to a bitcoin private key.189 If one
possesses a bitcoin private key, then one possesses those bitcoins. 190 If a
customer were to give a “bank” a copy of his private key, but retained
his own copy, then so long as the bitcoin bank did not transfer the key
into its own wallet, the customer would be able to transfer the bitcoins,
without the bitcoin bank’s approval, wherever the customer has the
private key.191
Because approving the transfer of funds, and therefore control over
those funds, can occur in any place, a bank account is not actually
184. Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 926 N.E.2d 1202, 1207-08 (N.Y. 2010)
(“ . . . where a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of one who owns or controls
property, it is equally well settled that the court can compel observance of its decrees by
proceedings in personam against the owner within the jurisdiction.”); cf. Lok Prakashan
Ltd. v. India Abroad Publ’ns, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 5852 (LAP), 2002 WL 1585820, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2002) (“It is well established that a New York court cannot attach
property that is outside of its jurisdiction.”).
185. This difference was one of the motivations behind the creation of bitcoin. See
Dowd, supra note 30, at 40.
186. A bank may be legally required to freeze an account. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5222
(McKinney 2014).
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., Mazzuka v. Bank of N. Am., 280 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1967) (an example of a restraining notice preventing a bank from honoring checks
drawn against an individual’s account).
189. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2 (explaining that ownership of a coin derives from
the ability to sign transactions and therefore from knowledge of a private key; no
intermediary is needed to sign a transaction and thus no intermediary can prevent actual
possession of bitcoins).
190. Id.
191. This is because, so long as an individual still retains the ability to sign a
transaction, he or she can transfer bitcoins. Id.
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capable of being sited unless by invoking a legal fiction.192 This is why
bank accounts are intangibles—because banks are no longer physical
warehouses for money, but rather warehouses for counterparty
accounting.193 The function of a bank is to tabulate who owes whom
how much.194 Those relationships are legal and financial and
accordingly have no physical situs.195 The concept of “Polonius owing
Laertes $100” does not exist anywhere, which is why referring to a situs
of an intangible is a legal fiction.196 Bitcoins, however, are actually
capable of being sited because they exist wherever a person is able to
control a private key and sign a transaction.197

192. Although this is not necessarily the case, as the account could be sited
wherever the banker makes the change to a single, centralized ledger book. Statutes and
courts, however, site bank accounts in locations not on the basis of where the actual
change occurs, which, with the advent of computers, can occur simultaneously in
multiple locations. These communications making changes to ledger books and
interbank credits and debits are not localized. See Joseph H. Sommer, Where Is A Bank
Account?, 57 MD. L. REV. 1, 7 (1998) (arguing that modern financial transactions are
communications).
193. Modern fractional reserve banking originated when goldsmiths who issued
receipts for stored gold, began issuing more receipted than stored gold. MURRAY
ROTHBARD, A HISTORY OF MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
COLONIAL ERA TO WORLD WAR II 36 (2002); see also Gordon Tullock, Paper Money:
A Cycle in Cathay, 9 ECON. HIST.REV., 393-96 (1957).
194. Sommer, supra note 192, at 6.
195. Id. at 7.
196. Cf. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (holding that a court can exercise quasi
in rem jurisdiction over a debt); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1, 16 (1928) (holding
that the doctrine of mobilia sequunter personam—”chattels follow the person”—
applies for tax liability despite its questionable philosophic underpinning: “[a]t common
law the maxim ‘mobilia sequunter personam’ applied. There has been discussion and
criticism of the application and enforcement of that maxim, but it is so fixed in the
common law of this country and of England, in so far as it relates to intangible
property, including choses in action, without regard to whether they are evidenced in
writing or otherwise and whether the papers evidencing the same are found in the state
of the domicile or elsewhere, and is so fully sustained by cases in this and other courts,
that it must be treated as settled in this jurisdiction whether it approve itself to legal
philosophic test or not.”).
197. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2 (“Each owner transfers the coin to the next by
digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner
and adding these to the end of the coin.”).
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An instructive example here is provided by two companies
Coinbase, Inc. and Blockchain.info.198 Coinbase does not currently
allow users to control their own private keys,199 while Blockchain.info
does not hold any private keys themselves, but rather provides software
and infrastructure to allow customers to possess their own private
keys.200 Much like a traditional bank customer, a Coinbase customer
cannot transfer his bitcoins without some approval by Coinbase because
the company reserves the right to block any bitcoin transaction.201 As a
practical matter, the company communicates with the bitcoin network
on behalf of their customer.202 This is a typical bailment where the bailee
has physical control over the underlying chattel.203 Blockchain.info,
however, does not control a person’s private key.204 There is no bailment
here, but rather the company is merely providing software.
Blockchain.info is much closer to a wallet manufacturer or a vault
manufacturer than to a bank.205
One implication of these two different arrangements, which will be
addressed below, is that customers have latitude in determining who can

198. It is entirely possible that both companies will change their business models by
the time of publication.
199. Although as of publication, the company has developed a service called Vault,
which enables a customer to use multisignature technology where he owns a majority of
the keys needed to make a transfer, with Coinbase still retaining some safety measure in
case keys get lost. This is not the core of Coinbase’s business, which is reflected in
Section 3.1 of their Terms of Service. Terms of Service, COINBASE § 3.1,
https://www.coinbase.com/legal/user_agreement (last updated Jan. 26, 2015)
[hereinafter Terms of Service].
200. Terms of Service, BLOCKCHAIN § 4.1–4.4, available at http://blockchain.com/
assets/pdf/Blockchain_TermsOfService.pdf (last updated May, 6, 2014).
201. Terms of Service, supra note 199, at § 3.1.
202. Id.
203. Richard A. Epstein, The Many Faces of Fault in Contract Law: Or How to Do
Economics Right, Without Really Trying, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1461, 1468 n.31 (2009)
(“[F]or a general discussion of the rules of bailment, see W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW: FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN (Peter Stein ed., 3d ed. 1963)
459-62 (discussing mutuum), 464-67 (discussing depositum), 467-70 (discussing
commodatum), 470-78 (discussing pignus, or pledge), 494- 504 (discussing locatio, or
lease), and 512-18 (discussing mandatum).”). For the Talmud’s approach to bailments,
see TALMUD BAVLI, BAVA METZIA, PEREK HAMAFKID.
204. Terms of Service, BLOCKCHAIN, § 4.1–4.4, available at http://blockchain.com/
assets/pdf/Blockchain_TermsOfService.pdf.
205. Id.
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control their bitcoins and where.206 For some, handing over their private
keys to a company like Coinbase may prove advantageous for security
reasons207, as well as for economic reasons,208 while for others, holding
onto one’s own bitcoins is more important. Whatever the case,
individual choice will lead to storage of bitcoins in places that satisfy
consumer demand; Coinbase’s addition of their Vault service, which is
more akin to a Blockchain.info service, is an example of how a company
will respond to market preferences.209
The owner’s choice of storage, as will be seen below, will also lead
to jurisdiction. If courts continue to treat bitcoin as a tangible with a
physical situs, individuals will be able to decide in which places they
want their bitcoins to be the subject of jurisdiction. 210 This may seem
like forum shopping and inequitable, but it is an endemic feature of
federalism—individuals choose where they want to own property and
regimes that respect property rights end up with more property. 211
While certain arrangements that individuals have with institutions
may resemble bank accounts, bitcoins themselves are not intangibles.212
In a bailment, it is still possible to site the chattel.213
The second argument against treating bitcoins as tangibles is that
bitcoins are incorporeal and capable of existing entirely as information
within the mind of an individual person—an example of these kinds of

206. Vitalik Buterin, Bitcoin Wallet Reviews—Ease Of Use And Security, BITCOIN
MAGAZINE (Mar. 5, 2012).
207. One wants to have backups for one’s private keys.
208. Coinbase has stated that it holds insurance against the loss or theft of bitcoins.
Coinbase is Insured, COINBASE BLOG (Aug. 27, 2014), http://blog.coinbase.com/
post/95927658922/coinbase-is-insured.
209. Kim-Mai Cutler, Coinbase’s Vault Goes Multi-Signature For Added Security,
TECHCRUNCH (Oct 29, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/10/29/coinbases-vault-goesmulti-signature-for-added-security/.
210. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Consent, Not Power, As the Basis of Jurisdiction, 2001
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 16 (2001) (arguing that sovereigns will compete to craft legal
regimes that satisfy preferences).
211. Cf. Max Raskin, Shop ‘Til You Drop: Forums and Federalism in New York’s
Class Action Procedure, 2014 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. PUB. POL’Y QUORUM 121 (2014)
(arguing that states should not abdicate their responsibility to craft individual legal
regimes that redound to the good of the citizens of the state).
212. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
213. JOSEPH STORY, BAILMENTS § 2 (9th ed. 1878) (defining bailment as “a delivery
of a thing in trust for some special object or purpose, and upon a contract express or
implied, to conform to the object or purpose of the trust”).
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bitcoin is the “brain wallet.”214 Using an algorithm, it is possible for an
individual to create a private key generated from a password or
passphrase that he can keep solely in his head.215 He can transfer his
bitcoins by merely vocalizing to the transferee the password, which
would then give the transferee access to the bitcoins. 216 This has lead to
situations where bitcoins are physically stolen when a thief compels an
individual, under threat of physical violence, to divulge the private
key.217 Similarly, in order for a court to control bitcoins to transfer them,
it would be necessary to exercise some kind of power over the owner
and the knowledge he has in his head, i.e. a court order backed by
sanction.218
The problem with this argument is that the mere need to exercise
power over an individual or corporation does not necessitate in
personam jurisdiction.219 A recent opinion by the Supreme Court of
Nevada illustrates how the mere invocation of personal obligations does
not make an action in personam.220 In that case, the court had to
determine the nature of an action to quiet title so that it could resolve a
jurisdictional question.221
A fanciful example illustrating that mere personal obligations does
not imply in personam jurisdiction would be a man who swallows
Krugerrands; if those Krugerrands would satisfy a judgment, a court
could order the individual to digest in the jurisdiction, or, in the case of
bitcoins, unencrypt access to the bitcoins, allowing a court to take
214. See, e.g., BRIANWALLET GENERATOR, https://brainwallet.github.io/ (last visited
Apr. 6, 2015).
215. BRIANWALLET, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Brainwallet.
216. Because “[e]ach owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a
hash . . .” and that digital signature is the passphrase generating the brain wallet.
Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2.
217. Jack Smith IV, supra note 154.
218. Cf. In re Boucher, No. 2:06-MJ-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *4 (D. Vt. Feb. 19,
2009) (denying defendant’s motion to quash a subpoena compelling him “to provide an
unencrypted version” of a drive on his computer by unlocking it with a password).
219. Cameco Indus., Inc. v. Mayatrac, S.A., 789 F. Supp. 200, 203 (D. Md. 1992)
(holding that in the absence of personal jurisdiction, a court can still issue attachment
orders against a party).
220. Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013)
(“[E]ven though a judgment quieting title vests title in a particular claimant, and to that
extent affects the interests of persons, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6
cmt. a (1982), its essential purpose is to establish superiority of title in property.”).
221. Id. at 1105.
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control of them.222 If a person refused to reveal the key, he could be held
in contempt of court.223 That a person can be held in contempt does not
mean that there is no res in question, i.e. the Krugerrands or the bitcoins,
but rather there are additional due process concerns.224
The third argument against treating bitcoins as a thing for the
purposes of jurisdiction is that bitcoins only exist in the context of a
network of computers that recognize the validity of those bitcoins. 225 In
other words, it may appear that when you adjudicate claims over
bitcoins, what you are really adjudicating is claims over interpersonal or
internetwork relationships.226 As the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws says “‘judicial jurisdiction over a thing,’ is a customary
elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in
a thing.”227 Gold may only have value in relation to the global market,
but because a person is capable of having interest in that thing, courts
are able to render judgment on those interests, irrespective of their
value.228 Bitcoin may only have value as it relates to the network, but
this is true in the same way that gold may only have value as it relates to
the subjective beliefs in a system of global finance.229
222. Federal courts have found no inherent Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
violations with ordering an individual to unencrypt a hard-drive. See, e.g., United States
v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1236 (D. Colo. 2012) (recapitulating the “[t]he small
universe of decisions dealing with the Fifth Amendment issues implicated by
compelling a witness or defendant to provide a password to an encrypted computer or
otherwise permit access to its unencrypted contents”); United States v. Kirschner, 823
F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (finding a Fifth Amendment violation because
defendant’s divulging his password was a testimonial communication); In re Boucher,
2009 WL 424718, at *4 (finding no Fifth Amendment violation because defendant’s
decryption of a hard-drive was not incriminating testimonial evidence).
223. “The court for the district where compliance is required . . . may hold in
contempt a person who, having been served, fails without adequate excuse to obey the
subpoena or an order related to it.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(g).
224. See Cameco, 789 F. Supp. at 204-05 (separating the constitutionality of
Maryland’s specific quasi in rem procedure with the constitutionality of quasi in rem
jurisdiction generally).
225. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 5.
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56 (1971).
227. Id.
228. Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013)
(holding that an action to quiet title, i.e. settle an interpersonal ownership dispute, was
an in rem action).
229. CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 137 (1871), available at
https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Principles%20of%20Economics_5.pdf.
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The final complication is that unlike a house or Krugerrands,
bitcoins are capable of being sited in multiple locations at once because
it is possible to have multiple copies of the same private key. 230 While it
is possible to pinpoint a private key to a particular hard-drive, copies of
that hard-drive can be dispersed throughout the world, just as copies of a
particular song can be.231
This does not mean, however, that it is inappropriate to have a
presumption of bitcoins as physically sited property. Firstly, there is an
incentive for individuals to keep their bitcoins in either a limited number
of locations or in locations to which only they have access; the more
locations where bitcoins can be found, the more likely it is that they can
be taken by another person.232 Secondly, as will be shown below, a court
is capable of immediately siting bitcoins to one location. Even though
the bitcoins can exist in multiple places at once, once a court comes into
possession of the bitcoin through attachment, it sites them to one
location.233 This is what the FBI did when it came into possession of the
seized Silk Road bitcoins—it transferred them into its own wallet, which
deprived all other owners of access.234 It then auctioned those bitcoin
off, which shows that subsequent owners can be certain that the owners
prior to the FBI no longer have access.235 By depriving other
jurisdictions of seizure, the court would effectively single-site the
property, exactly as the FBI did.236 As will be shown, for the purposes of
the judicial system, it does not matter where bitcoins have been in the

230. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2 (an owner of a private key can make copies of
that private key in multiple locations).
231. Cf. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“ . . . it is obvious that once a user lists a copy of music he already owns on the Napster
system in order to access the music from another location, the song becomes ‘available
to millions of other individuals,’ not just the original CD owner.”).
232. This is why the Bitcoin Foundation recommends encrypting backups and using
many “secure” locations. Secure Your Wallet, BITCOIN, available at
https://bitcoin.org/en/secure-your-wallet.
233. See notes 234-238 and accompanying text.
234. See Ember, supra note 103 (demonstrating that it is possible to site bitcoin in a
single location, inaccessible to former owners. The FBI was able to create its own
exclusive wallet with the following public address: 1FfmbHfnpaZjKFvyi1okTjJJusN
455paPH).
235. Id.
236. Id.
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past, but rather where they are when they become a part of a case.237 It is
at this point, when the bitcoins are transferred into the court’s
possession, that they only have one situs.238
3. Multisignature Technology
The final, most difficult problem to deal with is the existence of
multi-signature technology for transferring bitcoins. This technology
essentially allows an individual to split a private key into constitutive
parts and require that a certain number of those sub-keys be needed to
verify a transaction.239 This new requirement is known as an m-of-n
transaction.240 For example, key ABC, can be split into sub-key A, B,
and C; in order to transfer the bitcoins associated with key ABC, a user
can program it such that two-of-three sub-keys are needed to send
bitcoin, such as B and C.241 The implications of this technology are vast
for escrow services, self-enforcing smart contracts, banking,242 and
secured transactions.243 Multi-signature technology also poses the
biggest challenge to the theory of private keys as objects capable of
being sited to discrete, physical locations. The closest analogue in the
macro world would be to a safety deposit box that needs two out of three
keys to open. Unlike this safety deposit box, wherever two-of-three subkeys are put together, that is where the bitcoins are physically sited.
At first look, this method does not change the above calculus of
determining the situs of the bitcoin: it makes the job of a plaintiff more
difficult in finding a way to assemble the private keys, but it does not
change the fact that only a combined private key is able to spend the

237. The deprivation of jurisdiction from other courts is an important concern that
will be address below, but what is important to note is that such deprivation makes the
case for bitcoin as a tangible—because there is a single site from which access from
other sites can be denied means that this is not like an intangible relationship. See infra
notes 239-52 and accompanying text.
238. Cf. Ember, supra note 103 (the FBI transferred bitcoins into its own wallet).
239. Sandy Ressler, I Sign, You Sign, We All Sign: Explanation of Multi-signature
Transactions, BITCOIN MAGAZINE (Apr. 2, 2014).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Coinbase has adopted this technology. See supra note 209.
243. Nick Szabo, The Idea of Smart Contracts, NICK SZABO’S PAPERS AND CONCISE
TUTORIALS, http://szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_idea.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2015).
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bitcoins.244 Instead of having to track down one private key, the plaintiff
or the court may now have to track down m private sub-keys.245 This has
an analogue in bankruptcy law where the assets of an estate are
anywhere in the world, making the job of creditors a worldwide
endeavor.246 The main difference is that in bankruptcy, any marginal
contribution to the estate is to be welcomed, whereas in assembling the
requisite sub-keys, m-1 is worthless.247
A solution to this problem will be discussed below, but for the
purposes of determining the tangibility vel non of bitcoins subject to
multi-signature demands, it is clear that while the job of the assembler
may be more difficult, because only one final, fully constituted private
key is what is used to spend the bitcoins, the location of that final,
assembled private key is the situs of the multisignature bitcoin.248
C. THE RES LOCATES ITSELF
Now that we have determined that bitcoin should be treated as a res
for the purposes of jurisdiction, the central question a court must answer
is: where is the thing?
As was shown above, the central feature that defines ownership of
bitcoin is ownership of the private key. 249 If a person controls the private
key, he controls the bitcoin and is able to transfer those bitcoins and
assert dominion over them.250 A person controls a private key whenever
he is able to connect that private key to the bitcoin network and use the
key to spend or transfer the bitcoins.251 When determining where a
bitcoin exists for judicial purposes, we will begin with this starting
point. A court in which a plaintiff can attach bitcoins to litigation by

244. The two combined keys then functionally become one key if they are both
possessed by the same party because they are unusable until combined. Buterin, supra
note 60 (“With multisignature addresses, you can have a Bitcoin address with three
associated private keys, such that you need any two of them to spend the funds.”)
(emphasis added).
245. Id.
246. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).
247. Ressler, supra note 239 (explaining how bitcoins cannot be transferred without
the requisite number of constituent signatures).
248. See infra note 274.
249. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2.
250. See id.
251. Id.
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having the court transfer those bitcoins into its wallet owns the bitcoins
is the court that can site and establish exclusive control.252
To determine where a bitcoin is, it is instructive to determine where
more-easily sited property is by asking: how does a court know for
certain that a particular house is within its judicial power? The court
may look at a map and its recordation system to evaluate whether the
address of the house falls within the borders of the jurisdiction.253 There
is good reason to believe that the map and recordation system itself will
be sufficient to determine the situs of the house.254 Suppose, however,
there was a typographical error and when the sheriff came to seize the
property, he found it was out of the jurisdiction—he would not be able
to seize the property.255 The sheriff’s ability to physically seize the
property is both a necessary and sufficient condition for determining a
physical situs.256 Thus, the sine qua non of determining the situs of a
thing for judicial purposes is the court’s actual exercise power over that
thing.257 For bitcoins, a sheriff’s physical seizure of them through
transfer into the court’s wallet sites them to the location where the
court’s wallet exists.258 Bitcoins are therefore sited wherever a court can
exercise power over a private key by transferring the bitcoins into the
court’s wallet.259

252.
253.

Id.
Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1354 (1982) (defending the power of recordation statutes and
their ability facilitate transactions and markets, i.e. to allow parties to know where real
property is located).
254. Id.
255. Cf. Murdock v. Chatham Cnty., 679 S.E.2d 850, 856 (N.C. 2009) (holding that
a planning director cannot unilaterally amend a zoning map to correct an error,
demonstrating that parties must respect preexisting maps).
256. Id.
257. A court can practically only exercise power over things within its jurisdiction,
i.e. power. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1977) (“ . . . since the State in
which property was located was considered to have exclusive sovereignty over that
property, in rem actions could proceed regardless of the owner’s location.”).
258. See supra note 234.
259. Cf. Ember, supra note 103 (demonstrating that the FBI was able to alienate
bitcoins transferred into the FBI’s wallet with certainty that no previous owner is able
to exercise control).
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1. A Court’s Power Jurisdiction
A court’s exercise of control over bitcoins makes it different from
the exercise of control over intangibles such as shares of stocks or
debt.260 In Shaffer, a statute declared all stock in Delaware corporations
was sited in Delaware, which allowed the court to seize the stock.261
This is a legal fiction because, in reality, shares of a corporation cannot
exist anywhere; rather, they represent a legal relationship between
persons.262
In contrast, there is no statute needed to say that bitcoins are in a
particular place because bitcoins are electronic cash and “chain[s] of
digital signatures” that exist prior to statutory recognition.263 Siting
bitcoin, therefore, becomes a much easier task than siting intangibles
because when a court comes into possession of the bitcoin, they can
ensure there is a single situs by transferring the bitcoins into the court’s
wallet.264 If there is a private key sitting in a safety deposit box in a
court’s jurisdiction, the court can simply send a sheriff into the bank
with an order to seize the private key, just as the FBI did by seizing the
Silk Road bitcoins.265 The sheriff would then transfer those bitcoins into
a wallet owned by the court.266 This transfer would immediately prevent
any other court from seizing the bitcoins, making it as if the bitcoins
only existed in that one location.267 Because bitcoins are capable of
being transferred into a court’s possession and that possession would be
exclusive, bitcoins are much like houses.268

260.
261.

See supra note 150.
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 192 (“The stock was considered to be in Delaware, and so
subject to seizure, by virtue of DEL. CODE ANN., Tit. 8, §169 (1975), which makes
Delaware the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware corporations.”).
262. As the court in Shaffer noted, none of the stock certificates were actually
located in Delaware. Instead the seizure seizures were accomplished by placing “stop
transfer” orders or their equivalents on the books of the Greyhound Corp. Id. at 192.
263. Nakamoto, supra note 2, at 2.
264. See supra note 150.
265. Just as the FBI did in United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y.
2014).
266. Again, as the FBI transferred bitcoins into a wallet that it controlled. Had the
court ruled the seizure illegal, the FBI would have had to transfer the bitcoins to a
different address. Id.
267. Nakamoto, supra note 4, at 2.
268. See supra note 150.
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2. A Court’s Constraints: Due Process and Comity
On the other hand, a bitcoin is not like a house for the simple
reason that a house cannot “exist” in multiple locations simultaneously;
this fact raises comity concerns.269 The following paragraphs describe a
spectrum of difficulty in dealing with such conflicts of courts.
On one end of the spectrum is the private key printed out on a sheet
of paper and stored in a bank vault in a given state where that private
key is the only one in existence.270 This makes the bitcoin virtually
identical to a house in that no other jurisdictions are implicated and it is
possible to both site the bitcoin and eliminate other potential sites in a
meaningful way.271 Once a plaintiff attaches the bitcoins and the court
seizes the private key and transfers the bitcoins into its own wallet the
court can be certain that no other court is capable of exercising power
over the bitcoins.272 The analogue would be that no other court would be
able to send alien sheriffs in to seize a house that had been seized by the
forum court’s own sheriffs, nor would any other court be able to claim
that the bitcoins were ever in their territory if they were solely in the
forum’s bank vault.273
On the other end of the spectrum of difficulty is a bitcoin private
key that is both controlled by multiple parties and exists on servers or
computers in multiple transnational jurisdictions—an example of such
difficultly would be a third-party wallet service, like Coinbase, which
has servers in multiple states and countries and enables multisignature
technology.274
Comity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
This is commonly known as “cold storage.” How to Store Your Bitcoins,
COINDESK (Dec. 22, 2014), available at http://www.coindesk.com/information/how-tostore-your-bitcoins/.
271. See supra note 234.
272. Id.
273. Cf. Arizona v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 208 P.3d 218, 223-24 (Ariz. 2009)
(holding that the state of Arizona could not exercise in rem jurisdiction over a bank
wire that was originated in an alien state and was thus not present in the state).
274. The solution to the problem of multisignature technology should be that the
first court that seizes one of the private keys should be the presumptive jurisdiction
where the bitcoins are sited. That court would then go about seizing the other necessary
sub-keys to complete the transaction. This is no different from courts seizing assets in
other jurisdictions, although in the case of bitcoin, it is an all-or-nothing proposition.
Alternatively, if it is clear that this court is incapable of putting together the necessary
two out of three keys, the court that does should get jurisdiction.
269.
270.
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The above spectrum poses two distinct problems, which are the two
central problems to simply allowing courts to exercise jurisdiction over
bitcoin wherever they can, much like the original territorial basis for
jurisdiction articulated in Pennoyer.275 The first set of these problems are
those that arise with respect to the due process rights of individual
parties276 and the second are concerns that arise out of conflicts with
other courts.277 The first problem is both an easier and more difficult
problem to solve than the second because a rich jurisprudence has
developed with respect to the due process limitations of quasi in rem
jurisdiction; it is easier because courts routinely ask whether jurisdiction
is appropriate, on the other hand, the fact that courts routinely ask these
questions shows that these are difficult problems.278 The second problem
is made easier in the domestic setting because of the Constitution’s Full
Faith and Credit Clause.279
III. DUE PROCESS OBSERVATIONS
Since Shaffer, the Supreme Court’s constitutional demands on the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction were applied to quasi in rem
jurisdiction.280 This jurisprudence has been revisited since initially stated
in its modern form in International Shoe.281
Multisignature technology is similar to an indenture, which was a deed written
out twice on a single sheet of sheepskin and signed at the end by both parties. The
sheepskin was cut in half with sawtooth, indented edges. The two would be fitted
together to show their authenticity. This draws a nice analogue to multisignature
technology, which cannot be deemed authentic until two (or more) of the pieces are put
together. JESSE DURKENMINIER, PROPERTY 618-19 (8th Ed. 2014). The key difference is
that a court can seize physical property even without the two pieces of the indenture,
while a court cannot seize the bitcoins. The existence of the two pieces of parchment,
however, means that courts would actually try to examine to see whether the deed is
authentic.
275. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733-36 (1877) (holding that a court’s power
over a party alone is sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands).
276. See infra note 280.
277. See infra note 317.
278. See infra note 289.
279. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. International problems here are beyond the scope of
this paper.
280. Karen Nelson Moore, Procedural Due Process in Quasi in Rem Actions After
Shaffer v. Heitner, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 157 (1978).
281. Compare Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), with J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2783 (2011).
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As an initial matter, a court’s exercise of jurisdiction must comply
with two demands: the statute that grants the court power and the
Constitution.282 In state courts, the extent of jurisdiction over
nonresidents is delineated in a state’s long-arm statute.283 In federal
courts, jurisdiction is determined by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which grants jurisdiction wherever a defendant “is subject to
the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the
district court is located.”284
Constitutional constraints on jurisdiction are based on the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.285 These constraints have
been articulated by the Supreme Court and set a ceiling of jurisdiction
above which no state can exceed.286 Some states, like California, have
long arm statutes that go right to this ceiling set by the Constitution as
interpreted by the Supreme Court.287 Other states, like New York, do not
go to the ceiling and self-limit the power that they are constitutionally
permitted to exert over parties.288
A. QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION
The existence of bitcoin in a jurisdiction poses two initial
questions. The first is whether the court has power over the bitcoins and
the second is whether the court has power over the person who owns
those bitcoins.289
With respect to the first question, courts that can seize bitcoins will
have to do so in compliance with the constitutional demands of Shaffer;
this is a quasi in rem or in rem demand.290 The reason for this is that if
282. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
413 (1984) (noting the Texas long-arm statute reaches “as far as” the Due Process
Clause allows).
283. See, e.g., id.
284. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(a).
285. Hall, 466 U.S. at 413-14.
286. Id.
287. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2004) (“A court of this state may
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or
of the United States.”).
288. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2009).
289. Cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1977) (holding that the court had
neither the power over the individual defendant nor their property that was located by
statute in the state).
290. Id. at 216.
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bitcoins are treated as property, their mere presence is not enough to
satisfy the Constitution’s due process concerns; minimum contacts must
be met.291 With respect to the second question, the in personam exercise,
courts will apply their minimum contacts analyses to determine whether
storing bitcoins in a jurisdiction is sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction over the owner.
In answering this question, it may be tempting to assert broad
personal jurisdiction over the owner by analogizing to a line of cases
involving specific jurisdiction over Internet companies.292 This line of
cases seeks to determine when an alien website has sufficient contacts
with the forum state to render the exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction constitutional.293 The analogy to bitcoin would be that the
existence of bitcoin in a state will allow the court to obtain jurisdiction
over the owner of the bitcoin through personal jurisdiction.294
In Zippo Manufacturing. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, a Pennsylvania
district court set out a “sliding scale” where “the likelihood that personal
jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to
the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts
over the Internet.”295 The court contrasted mere informational websites
that are passive296 with websites where actual business takes place.297
Numerous federal circuit courts have adopted the “sliding scale” test of
Zippo.298 What is important to note is that the inquiry here is into the
interaction between the forum state and the alien website, but not the
physical situs of the servers or connecting links.299

291.
292.

Id.
See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(W.D. Pa. 1997).
293. See, e.g., id.
294. Cf. Cameco Indus., Inc. v. Mayatrac, S.A., 789 F. Supp. 200, 203 (D. Md.
1992) (exercising jurisdiction over the bank account and not the owner).
295. Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
296. In a sense, no website is passive because requests for information require active
interaction between computers.
297. Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
298. See e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 453-54 (3rd Cir.
2003); Soma Med. Int’l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir.
1999); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1997).
299. The courts in Toys “R” Us, Cybersell, and Soma did not find the location of
packets of data or the location of tubes to be relevant in their holdings. Cybersell, 130
F.3d at 418-19; Soma, 196 F.3d at 1297.
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Note the diversity between these cases and bitcoin.300 With bitcoin,
the situs is actually in the jurisdiction,301 but when accessing a website
or sending information to the website, the situs is wherever the website’s
servers are and the access of data comes through the intercontinental,
global cable system that forms the backbone of the Internet.302 Thus, in
the case of bitcoin, there is no need to invoke the fiction of presence. 303
With bitcoin, there is physical presence of the res in the forum, but no
presence of the owner.304 This makes the kind of fact-specific inquiry of
minimum contacts more suited for the Internet question and the brightline property rule more appropriate for bitcoin.305
Returning to the first question of whether a court has power over
bitcoins in its jurisdiction, in Shaffer, the Supreme Court effectively
limited the exercise of prejudgment quasi in rem jurisdiction.306 For the
purposes of bitcoin, this means that unless the bitcoins in question are
related to the underlying suit, they cannot be attached to the litigation
until after a judgment has been rendered.307 Just as in Shaffer where the
mere existence of stock shares in a state did not give a Delaware Court
jurisdiction over those shares, the mere existence of bitcoins in a state
does not give a court jurisdiction over those bitcoins if they are
unrelated to the suit.308
300. Compare Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1127 (finding personal jurisdiction
based on website’s intercontinental contacts with the forum state based on nature of an
Internet connection), with Arizona v. W. Union Fin. Servs., 208 P.3d 218, 223 (Ariz.
2009) (denying in rem jurisdiction because the bank wire was not initiated in the forum
state and therefore not present in it).
301. See supra note at 234.
302. Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97, 10102 (2000) (detailing the history and technical characteristics of domain names).
303. 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (2012) (explaining that federal district courts can enforce
claims to “real or personal property within the district”); Lee, supra note 302, at 126
(finding no “analytical difficulty where the res is real estate or tangible personal
property”).
304. See supra note 234.
305. Id.
306. 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1070 (3d ed. 2014).
307. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977) (“Once it has been
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the
plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that
debt in a State where the defendant has property, whether or not that State would have
jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an original matter.”).
308. Id.
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Finally, it is worth briefly noting that bitcoin users are conscious of
where they hold their bitcoins, which opens up the possibility of explicit
contracting about jurisdiction.309 The Supreme Court has ruled numerous
times that forum-selection clauses and explicit designation of agents to
receive process are constitutional and valid terms of a contract. 310
Contractual arrangements between bitcoin companies and their
customers, like most contracts, are governed by explicit forum-selection
clauses.311 What these explicit clauses do is incentivize sovereigns to
craft legal regimes under which parties choose to litigate.312 As
Professor Richard Epstein puts it, “ . . . there is a competition between
sovereigns to see which one offers services that most fit the needs of the
parties.”313
B. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides “[f]ull faith and credit
shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of every other state.”314 At the outset it is worth mentioning,
however, that the problem of competing jurisdictional claims only arise
in the prejudgment context.315 Once a judgment has been rendered in
one state, seizing bitcoins to satisfy that judgment is not subject to the
same due process or comity concerns by virtue of the fact that the
Constitution demands states recognize the judicial proceedings of other
states.316 In Durfee v. Duke, the Supreme Court articulated the principle
that “a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit—even as to questions
of jurisdiction—when the second court’s inquiry discloses that those
questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the

309. How to Store Your Bitcoins, COINDESK (Dec. 22, 2014), available at
http://www.coindesk.com/information/how-to-store-your-bitcoins/.
310. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991); M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16 (1972); Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964).
311. See, e.g., Terms of Service, supra note 199, at § 9.12 (“This Agreement will be
governed by the law of the State of California except to the extent governed by federal
law.”).
312. Epstein, supra note 210, at 16.
313. Id.
314. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
315. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977).
316. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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court which rendered the original judgment.”317 While this does not
escape the problem of prejudgment seizures, that problem is an endemic
feature of a multijurisdictional world, and the problems here are not
unique to bitcoin; because bitcoins are treated as tangibles, there is an
“intuitive basis” to exclude other jurisdictions.318
CONCLUSION
It may seem strange to site bitcoins as property. Given that
cryptocurrencies rely on computers for their issuance, it may be
tempting to write them off as inscrutable digitals that are in need of
similarly complex rules written by technology experts. Yet the deeper
one digs into the inscrutable, the more one finds simple building blocks
capable of traditional judicial analysis. Although their genesis relies on
computers, bitcoins are alienable and capable of being both isolated and
instantiated. This makes them functionally no different from
automobiles or Krugerrands. For these reasons, courts should treat
bitcoins just as they treat other forms of tangible property. Innovative
technology does not have to mean innovative jurisprudence.

317.
318.

Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963).
See Simowitz, supra note 141, at 39-40 (laying out the problems that arise from
exercising jurisdiction over intangibles in a multijurisdictional world).

